

p. 2

The contents of this presentation are as displayed.

This presentation will last for about 35 minutes. I would like to receive questions and comments after the presentation.

p. 3

I would like to start with explaining about the grounding case of M/V WAKASHIO.

The bulk carrier M/V WAKASHIO ran aground off the south-eastern coast of Mauritius in the evening of July 25, 2020.

Although the vessel was vacant, about 1,000 tons of Heavy Fuel Oil C and other fuel oils were spilled into the sea, causing major damage to the waters.

p. 4

These are particulars of the M/V WAKASHIO.

While the vessel was sailing under the flag of Panama, the owner and the management company were Japanese companies. Therefore, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) started information gathering from such companies immediately after the accident, in close contact with other relevant agencies of the Government of Japan.

There were 20 crew members, including the Indian captain, on board.

p. 5

The hull of the M/V WAKASHIO was stable for a while after the accident, but she was not able to refloat her off the reef by herself. On August 6, 10 days after the accident, oil was found to be spilled from damaged parts of the vessel.

Therefore, the Government of Mauritius formally requested assistance from the Government of Japan.

In response to the request, the Government of Japan decided on and implemented a

dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR) Expert Team for 10 days of on-site activities and 14 days in total.

p. 6

Upon the decision of a dispatch of the JDR team, Japan dispatched six members, four of whom were those from the JCG having professional knowledge and skills on oil combating.

The subhead is my predecessor. One member was dispatched from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one member was from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for various on-site arrangements.

p. 7

As you know, Mauritius is far away at a distance of about 10,500 kilometers from Japan. Usually, it is convenient to use flights of about 17 hours via the UAE (Dubai). However, since COVID-19 caused a decrease in the number of flights, the flights of that time took 31 hours via Netherlands (Amsterdam), France (Paris), and Reunion (Saint-Denis).

The plane from Narita to Amsterdam was almost empty (each passenger could use an entire row).

The transit from Amsterdam to Paris failed, and maybe because of this, three bags were lost.

A plane of Air France used for the flight from Paris to Saint-Denis was full and crowded due to the flight decrease. By the way, under normal conditions, Reunion is a French department that is popular as a tourist site.

For the last flight leg from Reunion to Mauritius, the team used a charter flight (there were two flight attendants for six passengers) and arrived at the destination.

They got a harsh lesson early before arrival.

p. 8

According to the basic quarantine policy of the Republic of Mauritius at that time, entry of foreigners was not allowed basically.

Even if such entry was allowed, the entrants became subject to quarantine and were required to receive a PCR test at the time of entry and isolate themselves at a hotel designated by the government for two weeks (and receive PCR tests on the seventh day and the 14th day), and only if the tests showed negative, they could get out from the hotel.

Therefore, the team members received PCR tests three times in total at the times of leaving Japan and entering Mauritius, and on the seventh day of their stay.

In addition, they also received an antigen test at the time of returning to Japan.

Subsequently, they became subject to isolation checks via phone from the Consultation Center for returnees and potential contacts during their isolation at hotels and other isolation places.

p. 9

If the policy had been applied as it was, the team members would have been isolated for two weeks, which would have caused hindrance in on-site activities. Therefore, the team made a request and an arrangement through the Embassy of Japan in Mauritius so that the team members would be able to go out from the isolation hotel. In the morning of August 12, when their PCR tests showed negative, the JDR team members were allowed to go to only the countermeasures headquarter.

However, there were conditions on their conduct:

To use a vehicle arranged by the Ministry of Health and Wellness of Mauritius;

To take a personnel member of the ministry with the team; and

To wear protective clothes, masks, and gloves without fail.

Accordingly, the team members had to wear masks, protective clothes (Tyvek suits), and rubber gloves that they brought from Japan, in extreme heat during their 14-day stay in Mauritius.

p. 10

Next is about the base for the JDR team.

The countermeasures headquarter were located about 4 kilometers away and at a less than 10-minute drive from the hotel the team members were staying, which was located at about 20-minute drive from the airport.

p. 11

Persons dispatched overseas from agencies of the United Nations and persons engaged in oil combatting also gathered at the same logistics room as the JDR team.

As you can see, the room was an open space. In front of the magnificent view of the resort spot, the team managed to secure a place suitable for taking measures against COVID-19, as a consequence.

p. 12

From now, I would like to explain about main JCG activities conducted on-site.

On site, the team conducted a survey of the grounding vessel, attended a public-private meeting, gave a lecture on maritime oil combatting for the Mauritius Coast Guard (MCG), and conducted public information activities.

p. 13

The first is a survey at sea and coast around the vessel.

On August 13, the team started with a survey of the northern sea area but did not find floating oil or oil odor other than oil films with the color indicating a thickness of 0.00005 mm or less within the bay surrounded by mangrove forests.

On August 17, the team conducted a survey of the southern sea area. Since adsorbent-type oil booms placed on the coast were found to be oversaturated, the team advised the MCG to change them.

The picture is of a patrol boat of the MCG.

p. 14

These are of the situation on August 13.

While they can hardly be seen from the pictures, oil with the color indicating a thickness of 0.00005 mm or less is running out from WAKASHIO.

p. 15

These are of the situation on August 17.

As you can see from the pictures, a team member rode on a small boat of the MCG to conduct a survey of the accident site.

p. 16

Now, here is an inside story.

As some of you may already know, many grounding cases have occurred in these waters in the past in a similar way to the case of WAKASHIO.

These are pictures of wrecks of Dal Blaio, which ran aground about 100 years ago in 1920 on a reef located near southwest of a reef where WAKASHIO grounded, and left her bow up until today.

For your information, two 40,000-ton cargo vessels grounded in the waters in the past 10 years. The waters seem to continue to have a high possibility of maritime accidents.

p. 17

A survey was conducted also onshore.

On August 14, the team left the countermeasures headquarter riding on a microbus of the MCG that time to conduct a survey of a coast to the north of WAKASHIO.

The oil spill was drifted not only to mangrove forests but also to sand beaches and gravel beaches. At some part of the coast, oil penetrated even into the depth of about 20 centimeters.

Since preventive measures against secondary contamination were not taken for most of places, the team explained the importance of giving guidance and advice on skills and knowledge related to coast cleaning.

p. 18

These are of the situation on August 14. The considerable amount of oil was drifted.

p. 19

The second is the public-private meeting.

Discussions at the public-private meeting were conducted while attendees were not sharing the fact that the remaining amount of oil in the vessel was unclear.

Therefore, the team advised the attendees to take responses on the assumption that there was still oil left in the vessel.

Moreover, at a meeting only for the police, coast guards and other security organizations, the team provided advice on:

- Locations and methods of placing oil fences based on the results of at-sea surveys, image analyses and other similar data; and
- Matters of attention at the times of wearing protective equipment for oil combatting operations and landing recovered oil.

p. 20

The third is a lecture on maritime oil combatting.

The team gave a lecture for the commander and officers for oil combatting from the Mauritius National Coast Guard on specific responses to be taken against an oil spill accident.

Moreover, the team conducted a demonstration for understanding characteristics of oil adsorbents and effects of oil dispersants by using recovered oils that had been spilled and washed ashore in the accident.

p. 21

The JCG dispatched the head and a member of the National Strike Team (NST) having expertized knowledge and skills for oil combatting, and they played a central role in giving lectures for the MCG.

I will explain about the NST later in detail.

p. 22

The last is public information activities.

Since the vessel was related to Japan, the accident captured keen interest also from people in Japan.

The team accepted interviews eight times in total: three online interviews and two telephone interviews from Japan; and three interviews for the local state-run broadcast (MBC).

In addition to the interviews, the team conducted other online activities, such as a meeting with the second delegation and a communication test with the NST base.

The picture in the center is of when the team was explaining the situation directly to the prime minister of Mauritius.

p. 23

Responses of the Government of Japan were reported dairy in local news reporting.

In responses to this case, although they had not been vaccinated yet, the dispatched members were able to accomplish their missions as usual by fully taking basic protective measures for prevention of infection to COVID-19 (while they needed a long time to reach the accident site).

For your information, according to the latest local information, removal of the vessel stern, which was the last to be removed, was completed on 12th. The Government of Japan will continue to give support by assisting capacity building of the MCG, providing coast radars without compensation and other assistance.

p. 24

Next, I would like to explain about a grounding case that occurred within Japan last year.

On August 11, 2021, the bulk carrier CRIMSON POLARIS, which was full with wood

chips, ran aground off Hachinohe in Aomori Prefecture.

p. 25

The vessel was anchored at first but ran aground due to strong winds and waves. She once managed to refloat but then cracked. Therefore, the JCG started a rescue operation by a helicopter.

Eventually, the vessel split in two, and part of fuel oil was spilled onto the sea surface.

A public-private meeting was held face-to-face locally at Hachinohe, and a liaison meeting was also held online for relevant agencies in Tokyo. In addition, the vessel owner spoke to the media online.

p. 26

Therefore the JCG commenced oil dispersing by a patrol vessel. In addition, the already dispatched National Strike Team conducted a coast assessment from land using a drone.

Moreover, an oil dispersant that was approved for use in the public-private meeting was sprayed from a vessel arranged by the owner of the grounding vessel.

Through these responses, the JCG managed to process spilled oil at an early stage.

p. 27

Drifted oil reaching the coast was recovered promptly by the Maritime Disaster Prevention Center (MDPC), which is a designated maritime disaster prevention agency stipulated in the Japanese domestic legislation, by using beach cleaner vehicles and other equipment after concluding a contract with the vessel owner for oil spill responses.

p. 28

In this case, there was No. 3 fuel oil tank was at the cracked vessel bottom, and



according to the vessel owner, about 400 kiloliters of oil was spilled from the tank.

After the accident, oil remaining at the vessel bow was taken out and removed promptly by a salvage company contracted by the owner.

The bow was totally grounding and is still left at the accident site. However, it is stiffly snubbed and waiting for removal soon after the maritime situation settles.

Also in responses to this case, although there were the effects of COVID-19, public and private related persons were able to take responses as usual by utilizing online means.

p. 29

In both cases, the JCG dispatched its National Strike Team from Tokyo.

The team is set up to deal with cases in and outside Japan immediately 24 hours and also provides technical cooperation for capacity building of foreign countries' coast guard officers. I will explain about the cooperation in the following section in detail.

p. 30

Next, I would like to explain about international cooperation in Asia.

p. 31

Before the pandemic of COVID-19, the JCG had dispatched instructors, including members of the National Strike Team and the Mobile Cooperation Team (MCT), to 14 countries in the Southeast Asia, Pacific, Indian Ocean, and East Africa regions 52 times in total since 2017.

The contents of capacity building include oil spill response training, as well as on-site inspection training and arrest technique training, depending on requests of foreign countries' coast guard agencies.

p. 32

With respect to oil spill responding, the training usually includes a basic lecture, handling training of oil spill response equipment, at-sea practical training and other on-site trainings.

The JCG selects contents from the training menu and develops a training program in response to requests of the counterparty country to conduct necessary training and also invites officers of the counterparty country's agency to Japan and provides training seminars in cooperation with the JICA.

p. 33

As you know, dispatching of JCG officers to foreign countries and inviting of foreign coast guard officers to Japan have become difficult since 2020 due to the pandemic of COVID-19.

Therefore, the JCG now provides online training seminars in place of dispatching its officers.

The JCG has conducted online training seminars for 8 countries in the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions 18 times in total since 2020.

The online training seminars include not only lectures but also demonstrations of arresting techniques and forensics and other contents involving physical activities so that the seminars will be interesting.

p. 35

Next, I would like to explain about the multilateral Marine Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX).

The MARPOLEX is an oil spill response exercise conducted by coast guard agencies of Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

The Philippines and Indonesia have jointly conducted the oil spill response exercise every other year since 1988 in accordance with their bilateral "Sulawesi Sea Oil Spill Response Network Response Plan." Japan was invited to participate in the exercise in

1993. With a view to enhancing international cooperation and support in maritime disaster prevention, the JCG started to dispatch its large-size patrol vessels and senior officers from 1995.

A MARPOLEX was originally scheduled to be held in 2021 but was postponed until 2022 due to the effects of COVID-19. It is now expected to be held in May this year, and the JCG is going to dispatch one large-sized patrol vessel and helicopters to the site.

As you can see, the JCG continues to support capacity building of Asian countries even under the effects of COVID-19.

p. 36

Last of all, I would like to explain about our cooperation with the Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ).

p. 37

For your information, before starting explanation on the cooperation with the PAJ, I would like to explain briefly about the Japanese National Contingency Plan at the time of an accident

As you know, Japan has ratified the OPRC Convention, and established domestic legislation and developed the National Contingency Plan pursuant to the convention.

Japan has amended the plan in response to the Nakhodka significant oil spill incident in the Sea of Japan and in conformity to its ratification of the HNS Protocol.

p. 38

As you also know, large-scale disasters occur frequently all around the world in recent years.

Being no exception, Japan has also experienced significant damage caused by heavy rains and typhoons. The Government of Japan has established Countermeasures Head Quarters and dealt with disasters appropriately.

The JCG has dispatched many patrol vessels and airplanes to disaster sites immediately and has been engaged in search, rescue, and transport operations not only by sea but also by land.

p. 39

In response to such frequent occurrence of disasters, the National Contingency Plan was amended last year.

The chief of a Countermeasures Head Quarter of the government in a large-scale or emergency disaster used to be served by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, but now in an emergency disaster, which requires immediate responses, it is served by the Prime Minister so that the entire government can respond to the disaster quickly.

p. 40

Lastly, I would like to explain about our cooperation with the Petroleum Association of Japan (PAJ).

Based on the previously mentioned National Contingency Plan, the PAJ and the JCG respond in a cooperative manner to large-scale oil spills and other accidents occurring within Japan and its adjacent waters.

The JCG gives first priority to life-saving and marine contamination prevention using patrol vessels and airplanes it owns, but the amount of equipment it owns for preventing and removing oil and other hazardous and noxious substances is limited.

In a large-scale accident, therefore, upon request of the causer or the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, the PAJ is to lend the JCG such equipment.

The lending operation contributes largely to measures against maritime disasters.

In the past, the equipment was actually lent in the previously mentioned oil-spill case of Nakhodka and other cases.

p. 41

Moreover, based on the domestic legislation, the JCG has developed its Regional Contingency Plan, which divides the Japanese territorial waters into 16 waters to respond to a massive spill of oil or a hazardous and noxious substance (HNS).

Part of equipment the PAJ owns for preventing and removing oil is also included in the Regional Contingency Plan.

It is notable that the PAJ owns high-capacity oil skimmers, which the JCG does not own, and therefore roles at the time of an accident are divided between the PAJ and the JCG.

While a large-scale case has not occurred in recent years, the JCG would like to continue to cooperate with the PAJ by utilizing this type of workshops and other opportunities.

Thank you very much for your attention.